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NOTES

THE INSURED'S OBLIGATION TO PAY AS "FINALLY
DETERMINED" UNDER THE NO-ACTION
CLAUSE
Where an automobile liability insurance policy requires the insurer to pay only after the insured's obligation has been "finally
determined ... by judgment," the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
held in Clougherty v. Royal Insurance Co.' that, under New York
law, judgments by which New York plaintiffs recovered against
an insured were final on the day they were filed, rather than on
the day time for appeal had expired.
The language construed by the court is part of a standard
clause in liability contracts commonly known as the "no-action"
clause. A no-action clause prohibits suit against the insurer unless
"as a condition precedent . . . the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined . . . by judgment."

There is a conflict of authority as to when the insured's obligation
is "finally determined" in this context.2 One view is that the
required finality is complete upon entry of judgment against the
insured after trial, notwithstanding that the judgment may be appealed.3 The other view is that there can be no final determination
of the insured's obligation to pay until the expiration of the appeal period on the judgment,4 or until a pending appeal has been
decided.'
After presenting the facts and holding of the Clougherty case,
this Note will briefly discuss the function and relevance of the
1. 232 A.2d 610 (R.I. 1967).
2. See the general discussions in 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
& PRACTICE § 4854 (1962); 8 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW & PRACTICE
§ 344.3 (1966); 12 G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2d, § 45:857 (1964). Annots., 125
A.L.R. 755 (1940); 159 A.L.R. 774 (1945).
3. E.g., Larson v. Daulphin Realty Co., 228 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa.
1964); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gantt, 256 Ala. 553, 54 So. 2d 595 (1951); General Acc. & Life Assur. Corp. v. Harris, 117 So. 2d 44 (Fla. App. 1960);
Pape v. Red Cab Mut. Cas. Co., 128 Misc. 456, 219 N.Y.S. 135 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
4. Tucker v. State Auto. Ins. Co., 280 Ky. 212, 132 S.W.2d 935 (1939).
Contra, Edwards v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (1929).
5. E.g., Jennings v. Ward, 114 Cal. App. 536, 300 P. 129 (1931);
Roberts v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ill. App. 408, 2 N.E.2d 132 (1936);
Tucker v. State Auto Ins. Co., 280 Ky. 212, 132 S.W.2d 935 (1939); Wentzel
v. Huebner, 78 S.D. 471, 104 N.W.2d 476 (1960). This view has also been
expressed as the general rule. See Annot., 159 A.L.R. 776 (1945).
See
also 29A Am. JUR. Insurance § 1495 (1960).
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no-action clause in light of modern insurance legislation covering
actions against insurers. The conflicting cases which have considered the issue raised by Clougherty will then be analyzed to
demonstrate that the result reached by the Rhode Island court best
promotes the purposes of the insurance contract. Finally, the case
support and analysis offered by Clougherty will be probed in a
consideration of conflicting New York law regarding the issue.
THE CLOUGHERTY CASE

The issue posed by Clougherty evolved from negligence actions
which were filed in New York and Rhode Island by different plaintiffs against the insured of the defendant Royal Insurance Company. The actions were for damages resulting from a single automobile collision which occurred in Rhode Island. Judgments in
the New York actions were entered on June 16, 1965, on which
date execution was available by the New York plaintiffs against
the insured. No appeal was sought on the New York judgments,
and the appeal period expired on July 16, 1965.6 Judgments against
the insured in the Rhode Island actions under the law then in
effect,7 were entered on date of expiration of the appeal period;
this occurred on July 16, 1965.
The insured's coverage would not satisfy both the New York
and Rhode Island judgments. The plaintiffs in Rhode Island
brought suit against the insurer to compel a pro-rata distribution
of the proceeds of the policy. They contended that under the noaction clause the insured's obligation was not "finally determined"
in the New York judgments until the expiration of the appeal
period, at which time the judgments would have been conclusive.
As the appeal period on the New York judgments expired on
July 16, 1965, the same day as the appeal period expired on the
plaintiffs' Rhode Island judgments, the plaintiffs contended that
both judgments were final at the same time; and a pro-rata distribution of the policy proceeds was therefore required. The defendant insurer contended that as no appeal was sought in the New
York tort actions, they were "finally determined" on the date of
entry of judgment against the insured. This was June 16, 1965,
one month prior to entry of judgment in the Rhode Island actions.
Consequently, the insurer argued, the New York plaintiffs have a
6. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 5513 (McKinney 1966). This section provides that an appeal as of right must be taken within thirty days upon
notice of entry of judgment.
7. The Rhode Island law, as it existed at the time the Clougherty
judgments were rendered, provided that a judgment or sentence entered
seven days after a decision on a motion for a new trial. Motions for a
new trial in the Clougherty case were filed and denied on July 9, 1965 and
judgment was entered on July 16, 1965. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-23-3
(1956). This section has subsequently been amended to eliminate its application to sentences. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-23-3 (1956) (Supp. 1966).
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a prior right to satiscoverage. The Rhode
with the nominal balremain after payment

A majority of the court in Clougherty agreed with the insurer
that the obligation of its insured under the terms of the no-action
clause was "finally determined" on date of entry of judgment.
The court was applying New York law, which the parties had
agreed would be controlling since the policy had been issued in
New York. The court discounted authority 9 which held that the
insured's obligation was not "finally determined" if subject to appeal as this authority was based on a New York case10 which had
been subsequently disapproved."
The majority found, however,
that dicta in Pape v. Red Cab Mutual Casualty Co. 12 had construed
policy language substantially similar to that in Clougherty. In
Pape, the plaintiff, as judgment creditor, was allowed to garnish
an insurer of a judgment debtor who had filed a notice of appeal
but did not file the necessary supersedeas to stay execution of the
judgment pending outcome of the appeal. The Pape court rejected
the insurer's contention that garnishment was premature because
the insured's obligation was not "finally determined" while an appeal was pending, although admittedly the judgment was unsuperseded. It was the court's opinion that the policy did not
require the insured's obligation to be fixed beyond all possibility
of appeal for the insurer to be liable. A majority of the Clougherty
court agreed with the view expressed in Pape, finding support for
13
this result in other jurisdictions.
A dissenting justice in Clougherty would find that the language "finally determined by judgment" was ambiguous. Between
a technical interpretation, meaning a determination of the rights
of the parties after trial whether subject to review or not, and a
popular interpretation, meaning a conclusive adjudication of a
party's rights beyond appeal, the more popular view would be
8. David v. Bauman, 24 Misc. 2d 67, 196 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
Where multiple claimants seek satisfaction from a single insurance
policy the clear majority rule is that priority is determined by date of
judgment against the insured. Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 416 (1960).
9. Tucker v. State Auto. Ins. Co., 280 Ky. 212, 132 S.W.2d 935 (1939).
10. Schroeder v. Columbia Cas. Co., 126 Misc. 205, 213 N.Y.S. 649
(Sup. Ct. 1925).
11. Materazzi v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 157 Misc. 365, 283 N.Y.S.
942 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
12. 128 Misc. 456, 219 N.Y.S. 135 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
13. Larson v. Daulphin Realty Co., 228 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 448 (Fla. App.
1960); General Acc. & Life Assur. Corp. v. Harris, 117 So. 2d 44 (Fla. App.
1960).
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preferred as a matter of construction. 14 The dissent would conclude that both the New York and Rhode Island judgments were
"finally determined" at the end of their respective appeal periods.
As this was on the same day in both states the judgments were
equal in time and a pro-rata distribution among all the parties
would be required.
Whether the no-action clause contemplates the insured's obligation to pay as "finally determined" by entry of judgment after
trial or only after an appeal is decided, is an issue which has
found an unique presentation in the Clougherty setting due to the
coincidental expiration of the appeal periods in separate judgments.
In fact, Clougherty appears to be the first case where the issue in
question has appeared under these circumstances.
Usually the courts have had to construe the language "finally
determined by judgment" when a single party plaintiff seeks to
garnish the insurance coverage of an insured who has appealed a
judgment against him.'
In most cases the claimant cannot garnish the insurer as the insured usually complies with the required supersedeas procedure, which provides for the filing of a
bond with the court to secure the plaintiff's judgment, thereby
staying execution until the appeal is decided. In some instances,
however, an appeal is taken by an insured without filing supersedeas; for example, when the insured is insolvent and cannot
secure the appeal bond, or when the judgment is in excess of
coverage and only supersedeas in the amount of the coverage is
filed. In either case, since most jurisdictions require that at least
the total judgment be superseded to stay execution, the plaintiff
has a right to seek execution pending outcome of the appeal.
Execution against the insured is futile as he is usually judgmentproof; otherwise, a sufficient supersedeas bond could probably
have been secured. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff seeks
to garnish the insurer as creditor of the insured judgment-debtor.
The insurer's usual defense is that garnishment is premature as
the insured's obligation is not "finally determined" under the noaction clause. 6 To determine whether garnishing of the insurer is
premature, the courts have had to construe whether the insured's
obligation is "finally determined" after trial or after appeal. It
was such garnishment settings which prevailed in the cases cited
by Clougherty. Hopefully, a satisfactory and consistent construction of the questioned language of the no-action clause can be
14. Dean v. Marschall, 90 Hun. 335, 35 N.Y.S. 724 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
See Joyce v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 321 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. App. 1959).
15. E.g., Larson v. Daulphin Realty Co., 228 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa.
1964); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gantt, 256 Ala. 553, 54 So. 2d 595 (1951);
Jennings v. Ward, 114 Cal. App. 536, 300 P. 129 (1931); Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 448 (Fla. App. 1960); Hecht v.
James, 345 P.2d 246 (Ore. 1959).
16. E.g., Conley v. Singleton, 171 So. 2d 65 (Fla. App. 1965).
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found that will apply not only to the conflicting garnishment
cases, 17 but also to other settings which are troubled by similar
language. The Clougherty case is a novel example.
THE No-ACTION CLAUSE

The standard no-action clause reads:
Action Against Company: No action shall lie against the
company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this
policy, now until the amount of the insured's obligation to
pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written
agreement of the insured, the claimant, and the company.'
In one form or another the no-action clause has always been
found in insurance contracts. The clause has several purposes. It
expressly permits a cause of action against the insurer for recovery under the policy once policy conditions have been fulfilled.'
Joinder of the insured and insurer in a suit is prohibited,
20
and settlements without the consent of the insurer are barred.
Finally, the no-action clause prevents fraudulent claims against
the insurer by providing for proof of judgment against the insured.
However, the no-action clause is no longer as determinable as it
once was in setting forth these rights. Rather, the clause is now
an expression of the statutory or case law which has enveloped the
insurance practice, and which is in large part due to the inequities
inherent in earlier insurance contracts.
Originally, most insurance underwriting was of an indemnity
nature.2 1 The insured was reimbursed by his insurer after he first
paid a claimant any judgment recovered against him. When a judgment was recovered against an insolvent or otherwise judgmentproof insured, the inequity inherent in an indemnity setting became apparent. The insured could not recover from his insurer
until he had first satisfied the judgment, and under the policy
terms the claimant did not have a right of direct action against
the insurer for recovery of the judgment.
Reaction to indemnity contracts resulted in remedial legislation which provided that insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured
would not bar recovery from the insurer to the extent of policy
limits. Such provisions are now a universal aspect of insurance
legislation. A concomitant development was the enactment in
17. E.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gantt, 256 Ala. 553, 54 So. 2d 595 (1951)
(garnishment not premature); Jennings v. Ward, 114 Cal. App. 536, 300
P. 129 (1931) (garnishment held premature).
18. See, e.g., Clougherty v. Royal Insurance Co., 232 A.2d 610 (R.I.
1967).
19. See 12 G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2D § 45:857 (1964).
20. Simon v. Maryland, 353 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1965).

21.

2 R.

LoNG, LAW OF LiABirUTY INSURANCE

§ 20.02 (1966).
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most jurisdictions of direct-action statutes, which permit direct
suit by the claimant against the insurer
of a tort defendant from
22
whom a judgment has been recovered.
In a few jurisdictions direct-action legislation has been construed as invalidating the no-action clause, permitting direct suit
against the insurer on the cause of action, with or without joinder
of the insured.23 In the majority of jurisdictions, however, the
no-action clause is still given effect since direct-action statutes
are construed or otherwise permit suit against the insurer only
after the condition precedent of "final judgment" on the cause of
action against the insured has been fulfilled. 24 Even in the absence of a direct-action statute, it is now generally held that a
claimant who has obtained a judgment against an insured may
recover the policy proceeds in an execution proceeding by way of
garnishing the insurer as a creditor of the insured tort defendant. 2
The practical effect of either a direct-action statute or a garnishment proceeding against the insurer is the same: an insured's
coverage becomes subject to the satisfaction of a claimant's judgment. But in a garnishment action and under most direct-action
statutes, the no-action clause is an effective agreement which does
not permit recovery against the insurer until the insured's obligation is "finally determined by judgment." Despite legislation which
has largely supplanted the function of the no-action clause and
was expressly intended to give injured parties a remedial action
against insurers, the issue has been unsettled as to the effect of
an appeal on the finality of the insured's obligation to pay under
the no-action clause.
No FINALITY PENDING APPEAL
The older and stated majority view was that the insured's obligation was not "finally determined" until the appeal period expired
or until a taken appeal was decided.20 But the modern and nearly
unanimous opinion is that a judgment is "finally determined" after
trial regardless of the possibility of an appeal.27
22. See 7 AM. JUR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 211 (1963).
23. See G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2D, § 45:836 (1964); 7 AM. JUR. 2d
Automobile Insurance § 211 (1963); Annot., 159 A.L.R. 777 (1945).
24. See 7 AM. JUR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 211 (1963); Annot.,
159 A.L.R. 777 (1945).
25. 8 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW & PRACTICE § 341.6 (1962);
12 G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2D § 45:898 (1964); 45 C.J.S. Garnishment § 110
(1943). In some states it isan equitable action. 2 R. LONG, LAW OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE § 20.05 (1966).
26. See note 5 supra.
27. Tipton v. Brady, 229 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Okla. 1964); Larson v.
Daulphin Realty Co., 228 F. Supp. 952 (E.D.Pa. 1964), criticizing Arsht v.
Hatton, 80 F. Supp. 148 (E.D.Pa. 1948); Cassidy v. Southern Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co., 135 F.Supp. 757 (W.D.Ark. 1955), criticizing Fidelity & Cas.
Co.v.Fordyce, 64 Ark.174, 41 S.W.420 (1897); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v.Gantt,
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The older cases have submitted three reasons why an appeal
must be decided before the insured's obligation was "finally determined" under the no-action clause. First, the procedural law of
some states defines an appeal as a continuation of the trial judgment, rather than a separate proceeding apart from the trial disposition of a case. 28 Second, if payment by the insurer to the
claimant were allowed prior to disposition of an appeal, the insurer
would have to seek restitution from the claimant if the appeal
court reversed the trial judgment. 29 Third, an appealed tort judgment retains its unliquidated character and cannot be executed
until a decision on the appeal liquidates the claim.30
The first two reasons were utilized in the early leading case
of Roberts v. Central Mutual Insurance Co. 3 1 There, the plaintiff
recovered a judgment against a taxi-cab operator for injuries. The
insurer had provided the liability bond for the carrier as required
by statute. Pending an appeal of the judgment by the carrier,
plaintiff sought to execute the bond which was conditioned on
the payment of all "final judgments" recovered against the carrier.
The court held that execution of the bond was premature as there
was no "final judgment" while an appeal was pending. Two reasons were given. First, under Illinois procedural law an appeal is
considered "a continuation of a proceeding in the court below"
and therefore not final.3 2 Secondly, to construe the insurer's obligation on the bond otherwise would lead to the "absurdity" that
the insurer would have to risk restitution if the judgment were
reversed on appeal.
The holding in Roberts was extensively cited and adopted without mention of Illinois' procedural definition of an appeal in the
Kentucky case of Tucker v. State Automobile Insurance Co. ss The
facts in both cases were analogous; but the Tucker court extended
256 Ala. 553, 54 So. 2d 595 (1951); Conley v. Singleton, 171 So. 2d 65 (Fla.
App. 1965); Consol. Underwriters & Richards' Adm'rs., 276 Ky. 275, 124
S.W.2d 54 (1939); Nikkari v. Jackson, 226 Minn. 393, 33 N.W.2d 36 (1948);
Materazzi v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 157 Misc. 365, 283 N.Y.S. 942 (Sup.
Ct. 1935), supporting Pape v. Red Cab Mut. Cas. Co., 128 Misc. 456, 219
N.Y.S. 135 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (dicta); Hecht v. James, 345 P.2d 246 (Ore. 1959).
Contra, Jennings v. Ward, 114 Cal. App. 536, 300 P. 129 (1931); Ancateau
v. Commercial Cas. & Ins. Co., 318 Ill. App. 553, 48 N.E.2d 440 (1943);
Lechleiter v. Cummings, 160 Kan. 453, 163 P.2d 423 (1945); Wentzel v.
Huebner, 78 S.D. 471, 104 N.W.2d 476 (1960).
28. Roberts v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Ill. App. 536, 300 P. 129 (1931).
See generally, 4 AM. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 358 (1962).
29. Roberts v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ill. App. 536, 300 P. 129
(1931); Tucker v. State Auto. Ins. Co., 280 Ky. 212, 132 S.W.2d 935 (1939).
30. Jennings v. Ward, 114 Cal. App. 536, 300 P. 129 (1931), citing Arp
v. Blake, 63 Cal. App. 362, 218 P. 773 (1923); Ancateau v. Commercial Cas.
& Ins. Co., 318 Ill. App. 553, 48 N.E.2d 440 (1943); Lechleiter v. Cummings,
160 Kan. 453, 163 P.2d 423 (1945).
31. 285 Ill. App. 408, 2 N.E.2d 132 (1936).
32. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 74(1) (Smith-Hurd 1956).
33. 280 Ky. 212, 132 S.W.2d 935 (1939).
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the Roberts rule, finding that a judgment against an insured would
not be "finally determined" until expiration of the appeal period.
As an appeal was taken in the Tucker case, it would appear that
their extension of the Roberts holding was dicta. It is submitted
that the Tucker court may have taken this language from the
holding in some cases that garnishing an insurer is premature if
the insured is appealing the judgment, by reasoning that a claim
in a tort action cannot be garnished if an appeal is pending since
the claim is still unliquidated.3 4 The leading case expressing this
third view is Ancateau v. Commercial Casualty Co.35 In Ancateau
the tort defendant did not file supersedeas during his appeal to
stay execution of the judgment. The court offered that although
plaintiff could execute against the insured pending an unsuperseded appeal, it did not follow that "the same yardstick" of liability applied to the defendant's insurer. Without directly construing the requirement of the no-action clause that a judgment
be "finally determined" to subject the insurer to suit, the Ancateau court said that it is elementary garnishment law that a plaintiff cannot enforce a claim against an insurer unless the insured
had a right to satisfaction from the insurer. The Ancateau court
passively stated that the insured could not have brought a suit
against the insurer pending appeal under the no-action clause;
therefore, neither could the plaintiff.
The reasoning offered by the Roberts, Tucker, and Ancateau
courts was probed and rejected by the Alabama court in Ohio
Casualty Co. v. Gantt.3 6 The Ohio court examined the status of
the parties in Ancateau and found that the proper question was not
whether a tort judgment was subject to garnishment pending an
appeal, but whether the insured, facing execution by reason of an
unsuperseded appeal, could have immediately sued on a claim
against his liability insurer. If the insured could do so, then a
judgment creditor could apply that claim to the satisfaction of the
outstanding judgment. The court reasoned that as an unsuperseded
judgment was collectible from the insured by any and all means
provided by law, the obligation of the insured was "finally determined" under the no-action clause for the purpose of fulfilling
the liability coverage afforded by the insurance contract. Therefore, in the Ohio case plaintiff was allowed to garnish the insurance coverage of his judgment debtor in the absence of supersedeas
while an appeal was pending.
The Ohio court also answered the two objections raised by the
34. See 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 91 citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. Nakand, 12 Cal. 2d 711, 87 P.2d 700 (1939), Quare: should this be true if

there are liquidating circumstances such as failure to file an appeal bond to
stay execution of the trial judgment? Arp v. Blake, 63 Cal. App. 362, 218
P. 773 (1923).
35. 318 ]1l. App. 553, 48 N.E.2d 440 (1943).
36. 256 Ala. 553, 54 So. 2d 595 (1951).
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Roberts court in denying garnishment of an insurer while the insured was appealing the judgment. The Ohio court did not believe
that the finality of the trial judgment under a state's procedural
law determined the finality required by the no-action clause. The
plaintiff in Ohio was pursuing a statutory remedy which made an
insurer liable for all "final judgments" recovered against an insured.3 7 The insured's policy contained the standard no-action
clause. The court was of the opinion that under both the statute
and policy terms, if an unsuperseded judgment was collectible
against the insured, it was a "final judgment" under the collection
statute and "finally determined" under the no-action clause. Otherwise, the insurance coverage would not protect the insured from
judgments nor secure the claims of injured parties.
It should be readily seen that the Roberts analysis of the noaction language "finally determined by judgment," which is based
on a jurisdiction's procedural definition of a final judgment, does
not lead to sound results. This analysis utilizes a technical definition having no relation to the intent of the parties or the purpose of
the insurance contract, nor can it be uniformly applied. The insured's obligation would be final after trial in those states where
an appeal is considered a separate proceeding, but it would not be
fixed until after an appeal is decided in those jurisdictions where
an appeal is a continuation of the trial action. The distinction is
artificial, having little relation to the purpose of the insurance contract. No matter how a state defines a final judgment, supersedeas is almost universally required in some form to stay execution
of the trial judgment during the appeal stage. This is true whether
an appeal is regarded as a separate proceeding or a continuation
of the trial action. 8 Under the Roberts analysis neither the insured nor the claimant would be protected during an unsuperseded
appeal in jurisdictions where a judgment is not final until after
appeal. In these states the Roberts result would allow the insurer
to favor an appeal by an insured but not feel obligated to file
the insurance coverage as supersedeas. If the insured were unable
to secure the appeal bond, he would be subject to execution.
This does not fulfill the insured's expectation that his coverage will
satisfy judgments against him. Moreover, if execution did result
and the judgment was later affirmed, the insurer would be obligated to reimburse the insured for his execution losses. In effect,
37. Plaintiff was pursuing a statutory remedy which conferred upon
an injured person a right to recover against a defendant's insurance carrier
"upon the recovery of final judgment ... ." ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 12 (1940).
38. See 4 AM. JuR. 2D, Appeal And Error §§ 364-373 (1962).
In
Illinois, supersedeas in a reasonable amount is required as a stay bond
during appeal. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 82 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
In Pennsylvania, a judgment is considered final until reversed. Larson v.
Daulphin Realty Co., 228 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1964). Supersedeas in
double the amount of the judgment is required. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1138 (1953).
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the insurance contract would become one of indemnity against loss
rather than protection against liability. Furthermore, if the judgment were reversed on appeal, the insured would risk restitution of
his earlier execution loss to the tort plaintiff. This was precisely
the problem which the Roberts court sought to avoid on the insurer's behalf when it denied garnishment of the insurance coverage
pending an appeal of the tort judgment. Is it any fairer to allow
the plaintiff to execute the available assets of the insured, thus
subjecting the insured to the risk of a restitution recovery if the
judgment were reversed on appeal?
The court in Ohio v. Commercial Casualty Co. 39 was not unduly concerned, as was the court in Roberts v. Central Mutual Insurance Co.,40 with the insurer having to risk restitutionary re-

covery if garnishment were permitted after trial and the judgment
were reversed on appeal. It was the Ohio position that the insurer
undertook this risk by allowing the appeal without supersedeas,
and the plaintiff risked returning the money if the judgment41
were reversed. This position has support in other jurisdictions,
but the restitutionary problem involved in the setting of an unsuperseded appeal has, nevertheless, concerned other courts. To
preclude any restitutionary complication should the judgment be
reversed, the courts have suggested that an appeal from the garnishment of the insurer could be heard at the same time the appeal
on the tort judgment is heard; 42 or a decision on the garnishment
appeal could be delayed until the appeal on the tort judgment
has been decided. 43 However, courts have objected that they
should not permit irregular procedure to correct the awkward
clarify the insured's
position of an insurer. The insurer should
44
obligation by revising the no-action clause.
ROBERTS AND TUCKER DISTINGUISHED:
THE MODERN INSURANCE SETTING
Both the Roberts and the Tucker case may be distinguished

in the modern insurance setting.

Insurers are presently in full

control of any litigation involving an insured, and modern lia-

bility policies usually provide that the insurer will pay all premiums to secure any appeal bonds in defended suits up to policy
39. 256 Ala. 553, 54 So. 2d 595 (1951).
40. 285 Ill. App. 408, 2 N.E.2d 132 (1936).
41. Tipton v. Brady, 229 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Okla. 1963); Conley v.
Singleton, 171 So. 2d 65 (Fla. App. 1965).
42. Materazzi v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 157 Misc. 365, 283
N.Y.S. 642 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
43. See Conley v. Singleton, 171 So. 2d 65 (Fla. App. 1965).
44. Id. The Conley court suggested that the insurers revise the noaction clause by providing that their liability "will not accrue until judgment against the insured has been affirmed on appeal." It is suggested
that such a change would appear to foster appeals and would meet with
legislative or judicial resistance.
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It does not appear in either the Roberts or the Tucker

case whether the insurer had such an obligation. 46 If the insurer
did not, the courts in those cases may have been justified in denying garnishment of the insurer pending appeal of the judgment
against their insured in order to prevent any restitutionary problem should the judgment be reversed.
In the modern policy setting, the insurer provides for the
appeal bond on behalf of an insured during an appeal and precludes garnishing of the insurance coverage. Thus, supersedeas is
filed and the courts are not faced with construing the no-action
clause or the attendant restitution problem which faced the earlier
courts.
But in some cases the insurers have elected to appeal a judg47
ment against an insured but have not chosen to file supersedeas.
When the plaintiff then seeks to garnish the insurer pending the
appeal, the defense is again raised that the suit is premature, as
the insured's obligation is not "finally determined" under the
no-action clause. The modern courts are nearly unanimous in rejecting the insurer's contention. 48 Two views of the no-action
clause are offered in holding the insured's obligation to be "finally
determined" after trial and not after disposition of the appeal.
FINALITY AFTER TRIAL

Some courts look directly at the language "finally determined
by judgment" to construe at what stage of litigation the parties
contemplated finality. They conclude that finality under the noaction clause means after trial regardless of an appeal. 9 If the
insurer meant after appeal, it should have stated so in the policy. 0
Furthermore, if the insurance coverage is not filed as a bond to
stay execution and the insured's obligation is not fixed after trial,
45. Many liability insurance contracts impose the following obligation
on the insurer:
pay all premiums on bonds to release attachments for an amount
not in excess of the applicable limit of liability of this policy, all
premiums on appeal bonds required in any such defended suit,
the cost of bail bonds required of the insured in the event of accident or traffic law violation during the policy period, not to exceed
$100 per bail bond, but without any obligation to apply for or
furnish any such bonds ...
Clougherty v. Royal Insurance Co., 232 A.2d 610 n.7 (R.I. 1967).
46. The Roberts court does not indicate whether supersedeas was
filed, or whether the insurer had an obligation to file appeal bond on behalf of an insured. The Tucker court distinguished an earlier Kentucky
case which had an appeal bond provision which was absent in the Tucker
setting: Consol. Underwriters & Richard's Adm'rs., 276 Ky. 275, 124 S.W.2d
54 (1939) (in failing to file supersedeas insurer "waived" no-action clause).
47. E.g., Conley v. Singleton, 171 So. 2d 65 (Fla. App. 1965).
48. See note 27 supra.
49. Larson v. Daulphin Realty Co., 228 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Conley v. Singleton, 171 So. 2d 65 (Fla. App. 1965).
50. Conley v. Singleton, 171 So. 2d 65 (Fla. App. 1965).
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the claimant's judgment will be unprotected should the insurer
become insolvent during the appeal and the insured is judgmentproof.51

While the analysis offered by these courts is satisfactory in
that both the claimant and the insured are protected during the
appeal stage, it may be fairly said that the language in issue is
equally susceptible to two interpretations. One is a determination
of the rights of the parties after trial, whether appealable or not.
The second is the more colloquial interpretation, which means
perfectly conclusive of the parties' rights beyond appeal.' 2 Considering the intent of the parties, a conflict of opinion could also
reasonably be envisaged. The insured would expect to be execution-proof during an appeal. If the insurer's obligation attached
on entry of judgment, it should have the duty to file an appeal
bond to stay execution; but insurers have contended that they
their obligation is not "finally deterhave no such duty because
53
mined" pending appeal.

The reasonable difference in the inherent meaning of the
language in issue and the possible conflicting intentions of the
contracting parties presents an ambiguity which would be construed against the insurer.14 But although this rule of construction is satisfactory in reaching a conclusion which protects the
insured, it rests on the questionable assumption that there were
conflicting intentions regarding the function of the no-action
clause. 5'
The best analysis that is offered by the modern courts is a
second view which emerges from a consideration of the purpose of
the insurance contract and how the no-action clause can best fulfill that purpose. The insurer received a consideration in return
for protecting the insured from judgments to a stated policy limit.
The policy proceeds are intended to inure to the benefit of an
injured party, who gains a contingent claim to the policy at the
moment the accident occurs.' 6 During any state of litigation, there
should be no lapse in either the insured's protection from judgment or an injured party's claim to. be satisfied from the insur51. Larson v. Daulphin Realty Co., 228 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
52. Dean v. Marschall, 90 Hun. 335, 35 N.Y.S. 724 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
See Joyce v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 321 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. App. 1959).
53. E.g., Conley v. Singleton, 171 So. 2d 65 (Fla. App. 1965).
54. Larson v. Daulphin Realty Co., 228 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
55. No-action language is an adhesion clause to most liability contracts. It would be less than realistic to say that the insured ever read the
contract, or would have some semblance of awareness as to its intent even
if he should have read the clause. Moreover, the jurisdictions appear to
be at odds whether the usual rule of construing the contract against the
insurer applies when standard forms are used. The majority seems to
disfavor the rule in these situations. 2 G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2D § 15:79
(1964).
56. G. COUCH, INSURAN E 2D § 45:857 (1964).
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ance proceeds. When a judgment is rendered by a trial court
and execution becomes available against the insured, the insured's
obligation is "finally determined" if the purposes of the insurance
contract are to be fulfilled.5 7 The injured party may then seek
satisfaction of his claim from the insurer, and the insured is protected from execution to the extent of the policy limits.
If an appeal is desired, the insurer has a duty to continue to
protect the insured from judgment and to preserve the injured
party's claim to satisfaction from the policy. These were the purposes of the insurance contract. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the insurer to file the required bond to maintain the position of
the parties, since the obligation of its insured has been "finally
determined." The insurer would be giving complete force to the
purposes of the insurance contract, while its ultimate liability
will not be decided until a decision on the appeal is reached.
SUPERSEDEAS IN EVENT JUDGMENT EXCEEDS COVERAGE

While the purposes of the insurance contract may best be
fulfilled if the insured's obligation is "finally determined" after
trial and the insurer is held to a duty to file any required supersedeas on appeal, the situation becomes quite complicated if the
judgment exceeds coverage. One view would require the insurer
to file an appeal bond only to the extent of policy limits, with
the insured filing the balance. 8 Other courts would have the
insurer file the entire appeal bond required to stay execution
against the insured, but they do not indicate what the insurer
has assumed to pay if the judgment is affirmed.5 9 Obviously, the
insurer should not be obligated to pay judgment beyond coverage
57. See Tipton v. Brady, 229 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Okla. 1964): To rule
otherwise would make coverage A ("To pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall be legally obligated to pay.") ineffective
pending the appeal without supersedeas or stay; Cassidy v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. Ark. 1955):
The purpose of requiring a supercedeas bond is to insure the
payment of a judgment if it is affirmed on appeal, and the defendant [insurer] should not be permitted to nullify the remedies
of the injured person by refusing to pay the judgment determined
after actual trial without giving to the injured person during the
appeal the protection afforded by a supercedeas bond.
Accord, Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gantt, 256 Ala. 553, 54 So. 2d 595 (1951);
Edwards v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (1929).
58. Tucker v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Ky. 212, 132 S.W.2d
935 (1939). Kennelly v. London Guarantee & Acc. Co., 184 App. Div. 1, 171
N.Y.S. 423 (1918); Yancey v. Utilities Ins. Co., 23 Tenn. App. 663, 137 S.W.2d
318 (1939). See also Roth v. General Cas. & Surety Co., 106 N.J.L. 516,
146 A. 202 (1929). See generally, 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW &
PRACTICE § 4688 (1962).
59. Rudolph v. Cassidy, 225 Ark. 951, 286 S.W.2d 489 (1956). See also
Reserve Ins. Co. v. McPeak, 181 So. 2d 662 (Fla. App. 1966); Roth v. General Cas. & Surety Co., 106 N.J.L. 516, 146 A. 202 (1929); Seessel v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 140 Tenn. 253, 204 S.W. 428 (1918).
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limits merely because it provided the entire supersedeas on appeal.
Yet it would appear meaningless to require the insurer to supersede the entire judgment if the claimant will have no right to
satisfaction from the insurer beyond coverage limits.
In most cases when judgment exceeds coverage, the insured
supersedes the difference. If the insured is insolvent and cannot
supersede the difference, the plaintiff is usually satisfied with only
the coverage as an appeal bond. But since the entire judgment is
not superseded as is usually required by statute, the plaintiff can
still execute against the insurance coverage and has successfully
done so in several cases." In such a case, the insurer will be faced
with the old problem of restitution if the judgment is reversed on
appeal. To obviate this difficulty, it is suggested that legislation
similar to the New York rule be considered, in which execution is
stayed as to so much of the insurance coverage that is filed as
supersedeas. 61
CLOUGHERTY AND NEW

YORK

LAW

Under the preferable view, the Clougherty62 court reached
the proper result in holding that the New York judgments were
final on the day of entry of judgment against the insured, as this
was the date execution was available on the New York judgments.
Clougherty cited the leading case of Tucker v. Automobile

Mutual Insurance Co. 63 for the proposition that the no-action clause
did not contemplate finality until the expiration of the appeal period.

As shown earlier, Tucker actually borrowed this proposition

from the case of Roberts v. Central Mutual Insurance Co. 64 While

Tucker did not discuss the point, Roberts was based on the idea
that an appeal is a procedural continuation of the trial judgment.
This analysis has been discussed and cannot be approved. 6 5 In
Tucker, moreover, an appeal had been taken so that the reference
to the necessity for expiration of the appeal period was unneces60. E.g., Larson v. Daulphin Realty Co., 228 F. Supp. 952 (E.D.
1964); Cassidy v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp.
(W.D. Ark. 1955); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gantt, 256 Ala. 553, 54 So. 2d
(1951); Conley v. Singleton, 171 So. 2d 65 (Fla. App. 1965). But
Wentzel v. Huebner, 78 S.D. 471, 104 N.W.2d 476 (1960).
61. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. § 5519(b) (McKinney 1963) which provides:
If an appeal is taken from a judgment or order entered against
an insured in an action which is defended by an insurance corporation, or other insurer, on behalf of the insured under a
policy of insurance the limit of liability of which is less than the
amount of said judgment or order, all proceedings to enforce the
judgment or order to the extent of the policy coverage shall be
stayed pending the appeal, and no action shall be commenced or
maintained against the insurer for payment under the policy pending the appeal....
62. Clougherty v. Royal Indemnity Co., 232 A.2d 610 (R.I. 1967).
63. 280 Ky. 212, 132 S.W.2d 935 (1939).
64. 285 Ill. App. 408, 2 N.E. 2d 132 (1936).
65. See p. 456 supra.

Pa.
757
595
see
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sary. Furthermore, it is unfortunate. The result which would obtain in following the Tucker analysis should be apparent. A
plaintiff who recovered a judgment against an insured would have
to unnecessarily wait out an appeal period in order to garnish the
insurer. In the meantime the available property of the insured
could be executed to provide an immediate satisfaction of the
plaintiff's judgment. The insured would then have to seek restitution from the insurer when the appeal period expired and the insurer's obligation had fully matured. Surely, such a clumsy and
inconsistent procedure should not be tolerated; and express authority that the insurer's obligation is fixed prior to the expiration
66
of the appeal period is preferred.
The Tucker court cited the early New York case of Schroeder v.
Columbia Casualty Co. 6 7 "to the same effect"; that is, an appeal
precluded the finality of the insurer's obligation. While the
Schroeder case has not been expressly overruled, Clougherty was
correct in its statement that it was considerably impaired by later
decisions.6
Moreover, Schroeder would no longer appear controlling in the contemporary insurance setting; 69 and there would be
70
little value in distinguishing the Schroeder case.
Clougherty did decide that the insured's obligation was "finally
determined" after trial, basing its decision on dicta in Pape,71
which the court found to be the applicable New York law.

The

dissent in Clougherty, however, appears to be on firm ground when
it found that the result in Pape was due to an interpretive, directaction statute which controlled the decision. The Pape court had
expressed the view that any doubts as to the construction to be
given the language in question were resolved by a clear statutory
72
mandate which required the interpretation it reached.
66. Edwards v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 2d 595
(1951).
67. 126 Misc. 205, 213 N.Y.S. 649 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
68. Imber v. Consol. Indem. & Cas. Co., 147 Misc. 758, 264 N.Y.S 554
(Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd mem., 240 App. Div. 820, 266 N.Y.S. 970 (1933); McDermott v. Concord Cas. & Surety Co., 128 Misc. 456, 265 N.Y.S. 795 (Sup.
Ct. 1933); Pape v. Red Cab Mut. Cas. Co., 128 Misc. 456, 219 N.Y.S. 135
(Sup. Ct. 1926).
69. Compare Materazzi v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 157 Misc. 365,
283 N.Y.S. 942 (Sup. Ct. 1935) criticizing Schroeder v. Columbia Cas. Co.,
126 Misc. 205, 213 N.Y.S. 649 (Sup. Ct. 1925) with Cassidy v. Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. Ark. 1955) criticizing Fidelity
& Cas. Co. v. Fordyce, 64 Ark. 174, 41 S.W. 420 (1897).
70. While the Clougherty court was correct in that the Schroeder
decision was impaired by later decisions, the Clougherty court may be
incorrect in concluding that the language in Schroeder requiring that the
insured's obligation be "imposed by law" was not analogous to the
language usually found in the no-action clause. Other courts have thought
differently. Bagget v. Jackson, 244 Ala. 404, 13 So. 2d 572 (1942); Girard
v. Comm. Standard Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d 483, 152 P.2d 509 (1944).
71. See discussion p. 452 supra.
72. The plaintiff in the Pape case was pursuing a statutory remedy
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Even if Pape were authoritative, doubt as to the New York
rule is raised by a New York case not cited by Clougherty. In
Youknot v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 73

summary

judgment was granted in a garnishment proceeding against the
insurer of the tort defendant when he failed to file supersedeas on
appeal. The court said that although the plaintiff's statutory right
to proceed against the insurer was dependent upon the "terms of
the policy," and a "final determination" of the insurer's obligation
was one of the terms, nevertheless it would be contrary to the purpose of the statute to withhold the plaintiff's right to garnish the
insurer in the absence of a protective supersedeas bond on appeal.
The implication is quite strong that the court felt that without the
statutory interference, there would be no final determination of
the insurer's obligation until an appeal was decided.
The dissent in Clougherty offered the case of Dean v. Marschall,7 4 wherein parties used the language "final determination of
litigation after trial" in a stipulation. The Dean court rejected a
technical meaning of determination after trial and concluded that
the parties intended liability to be fixed after the rights of the parties had been conclusively decided beyond appeal.
The dissent in Clougherty would reason that the language
"finally determined by judgment" is ambiguous, and the more
popular and colloquial view of conclusively decided beyond appeal
should be adopted.
It appears that the New York rule on this issue is in doubt or,
at best, conflicting; conceding ambiguity, it is submitted that the
dissent's construction is in error. Assuming that standard clauses
are construed against the insurer, 5 it can be proper to accept the
literal legal meaning of a term where the purpose of the insurance
contract can be sustained. 6 To construe the insurer's obligation as
attaching after trial has been demonstrated as promoting the purpose of the insurance contract. To take the more popular construction leads to inequities. While the majority opinion may lead to
inequity in the singular fact situation of Clougherty in that a satiswhich made insurer liable on "final determination of the litigation
after trial of the issue." N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 282-b (repealed 1929). The
court found that the insurer's remedy was by way of stay of execution
pending appeal, the implication being that the insurer had the duty of
filing supersedeas.
73. 158 Misc. 83, 283 N.Y.S. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935). Accord, Stone v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 240 App. Div. 1027, 268 N.Y.S. 989 (1934).
74. 90 Hun. 335, 35 N.Y.S. 724 (1895). A profitable discussion of the
Marschall analysis with regard to other authorities may be found in Joyce
v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 321 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. App. 1959).
75. The jurisdictions appear to be at odds whether the usual rule of
construing the contract against the insurer applies when standard forms
are used. The majority seems to disfavor the rule in these situations.
See 2 G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2D § 15:79 (1964).
76. 2 G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2D § 15:22 (1964).
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factory recovery by the Rhode Island plaintiffs is precluded, a construction against the insurer is based on the language of the con77
tract, not on the facts of the case.
To follow the dissent's analysis would lead to the incongruous result that had an appeal been taken in the New York judgments, the insurer's obligation to the New York plaintiffs would
have been delayed until the appeal was decided. In the meantime
the Rhode Island judgments which were not appealed would become final at the end of their appeal period. This would probably
occur before the appeals in New York were decided, and the
Rhode Island judgments would have prior claim to the insurance
proceeds. The equities sought by the dissent are present only in a
multiple-party situation where the claims of all the parties coincidentally expired on the same day. If coincidence were the measure
of equity, any day at all would be suitable for the fixing of the
insurer's obligation to pay.
CONCLUSION

Generally, present insurance legislation has now rendered the
no-action clause expressive, rather than determinative, of the rights
of injured parties against the insurer.
However, the no-action language of "finally determined ...
by judgment" does raise the issue of whether the insurer's obli77. In Clougherty the insurer was on notice that there were actions
pending in both Rhode Island and New York against its assured. The
insurer, however, waited until November of 1965 to pay any of the judgments against its assured, and when it did so it practically exhausted the
policy limits in first fulfilling the claims of the New York plaintiffs.
Since the insurer was on notice of the multiple claims against its
assured a more equitable solution to the Clougherty case may have resulted if the insurer filed an action in the nature of interpleader. Some
courts have been favorable to a pro-rata distribution of the policy proceeds
among multiple claimants if the insurer pursues this line of course:
[T]o permit preferential distribution would lead to races to begin
actions, with an added burden of litigation to the parties and to
the courts, and would have a tendency to prevent settlement of
claims.

Interpleader was a proceeding in equity . . . [and] when-

ever several persons were entitled to participate in a common

fund or were creditors of a common debtor, equity was, if the
fund was not sufficient to discharge all claims, or if the debtor was
insolvent, inclined to regard all the demands as standing upon
equal footing and to decree a pro-rata distribution.
70 A.L.R.2d 416 at 419, reviewing Century Indem. Co. v. Kofsky, 115 Conn.
161 A. 101 (1932). Accord, Burchfield v. Bevens, 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.
1957). An even broader remedy was utilized in Lloyds of London v. Jones,
261 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1953) when the court knew that the insured was insolvent and that the policy would not cover all the expected judgments in
pending suits. The court directed the insurer to pay the proceeds into the
trial court so that they may be distributed on a pro-rata basis after all the
pending suits were decided. For an excellent discussion on non-legislative
remedies in this area see KEETON, Preferential Settlement Of Liability
Insurance Claims, 70 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1956).
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gation is final while an appeal is pending. The issue has been
centered in garnishment and direct-action cases but can be raised
in other settings. The Clougherty case is an example.
A proper analysis of the function of the no-action clause in fulfilling the purposes of the insurance contract makes it apparent
that the insurer's obligation must be considered final after the trial
level. Furthermore, when an appeal is taken, it should be the
insurer's duty to file any required supersedeas bond to stay execution against the insured and protect the right of the injured party
to be satisfied from the insurance proceeds. The duty to file
supersedeas during appeals is not a bare imposition on the insurer
but a consequence of the insured's obligation, which has been
"finally determined" after entry of judgment against him. It is
suggested, however, that legislation be considered which will stay
execution against an insurer when judgment against an insured
exceeds coverage and only the coverage is filed as an appeal bond.
Such legislation would prevent garnishing of an insurer pending
an appeal by an insured, and preclude restitution by an insurer
should the judgment be reversed by the appeal court.
F. CHARLES PETRmLO

